




State Accountability in the Republic of Macedonia 
by Ana Pavlovska-Daneva1   
Effective control of the state entails the continuous monitoring of its performance of duties and tasks, compari-
son of the results with set goals, and the possibility of exerting some kind of corrective inﬂuence. In theory,
there are various forms of control over the administration. The classiﬁcation partly depends on the criteria
used to distinguish between types of control. Players such as Parliament, government, political parties as well 
as public opinion can exercise political control over the administration.  On the other hand, legal forms take 
the form of
• Internal and externally based administrative control;
• Judicial control carried out by regular courts or carried out by special administrative courts; there may 
also be special protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights by the Constitutional court.
• Control exercised by ofﬁces such as the public prosecutor or the ombudsman.
These three instruments are intended to ensure legality and protect civic rights against the actions of the 
administration and the executive. The ﬁrst type of legal control is carried out by competent, skilled, efﬁcient,
and conscientious personnel. The second is a system of procedural protections from errors and illegalities and 
includes the possibility that higher administrative bodies can remedy mistakes and illegalities themselves.  The 
third instrument is a system of external supervision by ofﬁcials who are neither part of the administration nor
the executive branch. 
The 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia is a relatively short, precise, and clear text that contains 
only a small number of provisions dealing with the issue of administrative control. The constitution does not 
outline contents, leaving this for subsequent legal regulation.  It does include fundamental civil and human 
rights and guarantees appeals against acts of courts, administrative bodies, or other institutions carrying out 
public authorities. Article 77 introduces the institution of Public Attorney, an ofﬁce that is broadly compatible
with the Scandinavian ofﬁce of Ombudsman.
Overall the General Administrative Procedure Act (GAPA) regulates administrative procedure. Thirteen years 
have passed since the adoption of the Constitution and yet a new GAPA has still yet to be passed.  Existing pro-
cedures mean that administrative body exercise control over the legality of their decisions and this is further 
enforced by a directly higher body. Such a procedure is initiated when a complainant ﬁles an appeal, or more
rarely by way of ex ofﬁcio application. Apart from this, the GAPA provides seven so-called special remedies
that, in the event of serious material or formal illegality, can be brought to bear against a decision.
In terms of the appeals proceedings under GAPA, there are certain inconsistencies in achieving a proper 
devolution of appeals. The principle of devolution means that only a body higher than the one that made the 
contested decision can act on the appeal. Inconsistencies in applying this principle become apparent when the 
highest body of the administration makes the ﬁrst-level decision. In such a case and according to the GAPA,
a Government Appeals Committee is authorized to carry out the supervision, raising some doubt as to its 
objectivity. This is compounded by the fact that it is standard practice for ministers whose decision is being 
contested to take part in appointing members to this Committee!
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The major ﬂaw of the GAPA is the number of extraordinary legal remedies, which allows any ﬁnal decision to
be contested and leads to endless procedure protraction. This obstructs the implementation of the most vital 
procedural legal principles such as res judicata and non bis in idem. Each of the seven special legal remedies 
that are prescribed, as well as the institute of “returning to its former state” need to undergo serious revision. 
Some can even be completely left out of any prospective legislation!
The Ombudsman is a Parliamentary representative authorized to process citizens’ petitions and to begin pro-
cedures on his own initiative whenever he becomes aware of illegal or inappropriate administrative activities. 
It seems that the whole world faces the need for an ofﬁce such as the Ombudsman.  The need is even greater
bearing in mind that the Ombudsman procedures lack the strict formalities and high expense of the regular 
courts.  Furthermore, the function of Ombudsman serves a psychological dimension that is very important to 
citizens.  It can enable a plaintiff to feel satisﬁed even if his complaint is dismissed, because he or she will still
know that they were listened to, that somebody was engaged on his/her problems, and that they did not have 
to suffer great expense.
The Ombudsman can also have a preventive function, demonstrated through the restraint of administrative 
bodies from future violation of the law.  As ofﬁcials become aware that there is a distinctive, specialized control
over their work, they take advance care and caution to avoid becoming subject to that control’s criticism.  The 
conclusion could be that the Ombudsman works to solve citizen complaints and, secondly, it works towards 
the improvement of the public administration.
Although there are variations worldwide, the general characteristic of the Ombudsman’s power is to act as a 
corrective of the work of the state institutions, without the capacity to issue repressive and coercive measures. 
Its power emanates from its authority to educate and convince, as well as from the personal qualities of the 
person that holds the position. The question remains what is the base on which the Ombudsman builds his 
or her authority?  The answer may lie in its independence, both from legislative and executive branches and 
second, it’s political neutrality.  This presumes a person that will be able to realize the responsibilities of the 
ofﬁce while remaining immune to pressures from the political streams within society. This is the big problem
for the Balkan countries where recruiting of public servants often comes about through the so-called “spoils” 
system. 
In addition, the constitution introduced the ofﬁce of the Public Attorney, which is again parallel to the Scandi-
navian Ombudsman.  Unfortunately, it created only the constitutional basis for the institution and it was not 
until 1997 that the Law on the Public Attorney was adopted.  This provides for the appointment, organization, 
competencies and methods of operation of the Public Attorney. The Parliamentary Committee for Appointments 
proposes the Public Attorney who is chosen from candidates proposed by the Parties’ Parliamentary Groups. 
Members of Parliament then vote on the proposed candidate. In other European countries the Ombudsman is 
selected with a consensus of all political entities.  If the selection is anomalous or unacceptable to everybody, 
it may lead to a perversion of this institution, as has happened with similar initiatives before.  Instead of being 
enacted in practice and in everyday life, the ofﬁce of the Public Attorney may turn into its antipode. It is vital
that the person appointed has personal authority, integrity, is professional and experienced and able to feel 
the problems of the common citizen and to deal with the complicated situations with great determination. He 
or she should have good communication skills and be prepared to listen to different opinions. Most important, 
is the ability to prevail over and isolating itself from party inﬂuence and everyday politics.
In the Macedonian legal system, the Public Attorney operates independently and autonomously, which does 
not mean it is a substitute for regular legal instruments. The Attorney is appointed from the ranks of experi-
enced lawyers with more than nine years of experience. Tenure in ofﬁce is for eight years, with the possibility
of reelection. Its ofﬁce is incompatible with any other public ofﬁce or profession or with a membership in a 
political party.
The Public Attorney is not competent to adopt decisions that are similar to the sentences and rulings of the 
Courts, or decisions of administrative bodies. Instead, he or she simply intervenes by way of suggestions, opin-
ions, recommendations, proposals, etc. That does not mean that they are less important than the decisions 
we mentioned above. To the contrary, the reason why such interventions should be even stronger is that an 
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independent body makes them. Furthermore, there is no appellate procedure foreseen for the interventions of 
the Public Attorney or the Ombudsman. The failure to act on those interventions brings the pressure of public 
opinion and media as its ultimate and strongest instrument. The public is informed through annual which are 
submitted to Parliament, as well as the special reports, press conferences, bulletins, publications, etc.inde-
pendent body makes them. Furthermore, there is no appellate procedure foreseen for the interventions of 
the Public Attorney or the Ombudsman. The failure to act on those interventions brings the pressure of public 
opinion and media as its ultimate and strongest instrument. The public is informed through annual which are 
submitted to Parliament, as well as the special reports, press conferences, bulletins, publications, etc.inde-
pendent body makes them. Furthermore, there is no appellate procedure foreseen for the interventions of 
the Public Attorney or the Ombudsman. The failure to act on those interventions brings the pressure of public 
opinion and media as its ultimate and strongest instrument. The public is informed through annual which are 
submitted to Parliament, as well as the special reports, press conferences, bulletins, publications, etc.
Judicial control is designed to protect both the rights of citizens and civil servants with regard to the admin-
istration. Independent bodies are created to regulate administrative conﬂicts. The modalities for carrying out
judicial control differ according to whether there is a specialized administrative judiciary as in France, for in-
stance, or whether administrative control is entrusted to the regular courts, the case in England, for example. 
There are some who argue that the second solution is more democratic, whilst others argue that an adminis-
trative judiciary allows judges to become better specialized.
The Continental-European system provides for the formation of special administrative courts for resolving ad-
ministrative disputes. The cradle for this system is found in France where the Conseil d-Etat was established 
in 1801, although the administrative judiciary was not created until the second half of the 19th century. The 
administrative courts, magistrates, or tribunals, as they are called in different countries, have no other func-
tion apart from the administrative-judicial.  While they are organizationally incorporated within the administra-
tion their work is completely separate from the latter. With legal control over administrative acts being their 
principal task, they are able to dedicate themselves entirely to this issue, and exert a genuine inﬂuence on
respect for law within the administration.  The most representative countries of the Continental-European sys-
tem are France, Germany, Austria, as well as Italy and Belgium, which used to belong to, but abandoned the 
Anglo-Saxon system. We can also add countries from this neighborhood: the Republic of Bulgaria, Republic of 
Croatia, Republic of Slovenia, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.
By contrast, the Anglo-Saxon system allows for judicial control over administrative acts by the courts of general 
jurisdiction. This system has been accepted in England, the United States, and other countries where common 
law applies. Here the state is subject to the same legal rules as the individuals. There is no separate adminis-
trative law which represents an aggregate of legal norms and which regulates the work of the administration. 
Judicial control over administrative acts in the countries of the Anglo-Saxon system is not conducted as part of 
a special procedure, as is the case in the countries of the Continental-European system, but rather the same 
procedure is applied as in civil matters -- common law.  However, more recently in England, a process of cre-
ating a separate legal public administration regime has developed, as private law and the regular civil courts 
have found it increasingly difﬁcult to deal with the complexity and density of modern administrations.
The Macedonian Administrative Disputes Act opts for neither model, instead preferring a combined version. 
There have been varying opinions on the justiﬁcation for this approach.  Those in favour see it as a successful
combination of the English and French system, as being both rational and economic, while retaining all their 
advantages (specialization, autonomy, special procedure, authority of the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Macedonia, and so forth). Doubts remain with regard to the authority of special administrative tribunals and 
the feeling remains that it may be more efﬁcient to allow the Supreme Court to have sole jurisdiction over
administrative disputes.  There have been certain amendments proposed to decentralize the power to rule 
in administrative disputes to the appellate courts. The existing legal solution brings Macedonia closer to the 
Anglo-Saxon system of legal control, ironically at the same time as England has seen ﬁt to develop a separate
legal regime for intervening in the state administration.  
We feel that there is need to amend the Macedonian system of judicial control with a view to ensuring adapta-
tion to solutions accepted in most European-Continental countries.  The importance of judicial protection of 
human rights from potential administrative underlies the indisputable need for reform in the system of judicial 
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control. Current powers are derived from a 1977 regulation highlighting the need to take urgent measures 
to introduce new legislation to address these issues.  It is widely accepted that the Supreme Court is over-
whelmed by a huge administrative caseload. This is a signiﬁcant hindrance to its efﬁcient working and citizens
are confronted with the problem of delays in exhaustingly slow and expensive administrative-judicial proceed-
ings.
Ultimately, the need to establish new legal institutes in the area of administrative law requires narrow speciali-
zation, profound expertise, and knowledge of the administrative subject matter by judges authorized to resolve 
disputes in this area.  All this leads underlies the importance of a new Administrative Disputes Act to create a 
separate Administrative Court. In this way, the Republic of Macedonia will be able to count itself among the 
countries that keep abreast of democratic trends, to abandon the system of general judicial control and create 
a special administrative judiciary. Naturally, this has to be adapted to the social conditions of Macedonia. This 
is no easy task, but the current state unambiguously points to the need to identify new modalities to improve 
the efﬁciency of judicial control over the state.
